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Simple  distributed  strategies  that  modify  the  behaviour  of 
selfish  individuals  in  a  manner  that  enhances  cooperation  or 
global efficiency have proved difficult to identify. We consider 
a network of selfish agents who each optimise their individual 
utilities  by  coordinating  (or  anti-coordinating)  with  their 
neighbours, to maximise the pay-offs from randomly weighted 
pair-wise games. In general, agents will opt for the behaviour 
that is the best compromise (for them) of the many conflicting 
constraints created by their neighbours, but the attractors of the 
system  as  a  whole  will  not  maximise  total  utility.  We  then 
consider  agents  that  act  as  'creatures  of  habit'  by  increasing 
their preference to coordinate (anti-coordinate) with whichever 
neighbours they are coordinated (anti-coordinated) with at the 
present  moment.  These  preferences  change  slowly  while  the 
system  is  repeatedly  perturbed  such  that  it  settles  to  many 
different local attractors. We find that under these conditions, 
with each perturbation there is a progressively higher chance of 
the  system  settling  to  a  configuration  with  high  total  utility. 
Eventually, only one attractor remains, and that attractor is very 
likely  to  maximise  (or  almost  maximise)  global  utility.  This 
counterintutitve  result  can  be  understood  using  theory  from 
computational neuroscience; we show that this simple form of 
habituation is equivalent to Hebbian learning, and the improved 
optimisation of global utility that is observed results from well-
known generalisation capabilities of associative memory acting 
at the network scale. This causes the system of selfish agents, 
each acting individually but habitually, to collectively identify 
configurations that maximise total utility.  
Selfish Agents and Total Utility 
This  paper  investigates  the  effect  of  a  simple  distributed 
strategy  for  increasing  total  utility  in  systems  of  selfishly 
optimising  individuals.  The  broader  topic  concerns  many 
different  types  of  systems.  For  example,  in  technological 
systems, it is often convenient or necessary to devolve control 
to numerous autonomous components or agents that each, in a 
fairly simple manner, acts to optimise a global performance 
criterion: e.g. communications routing agents act to minimise 
calls dropped, or processing nodes in a grid computing system 
each  act  to  maximise  the  number  of  jobs  processed  (1,2). 
However,  since  each  component  in  the  network  acts 
individually,  i.e.,  using  only  local  information,  constraints 
between  individuals  can  remain  unsatisfied,  resulting  in 
poorly optimised global performance. In an engineered system 
one could, in principle, mandate that all nodes act in accord 
with  the  globally  optimal  configuration  of  behaviours 
(assuming one knew what that was) – but this would defeat 
the  scalability  and  robustness  aims  of  complex  adaptive 
systems.  The  question  for  engineered  complex  adaptive 
systems  then,  is  the  question  of  how  to  cause  simple 
autonomous  agents  to  act  ‘smarter’  in  a  fully  distributed 
manner  such  that  they  better  satisfy  constraints  between 
agents and thereby better optimise global performance.  
Meanwhile,  in  evolutionary  biology  it  appears  that  in 
certain  circumstances  symbiotic  species  have  formed 
collaborations  that  are  adaptive  at  a  higher  level  of 
organisation  (3),  but  it  has  been  difficult  to  integrate  this 
perspective with the assumption that under natural selection 
such collaborations must be driven by the selfish interests of 
the organisms involved (4,5). In social network studies there 
is increasing interest in adaptive networks (6) where agents in 
a  network  can  alter  the  structure  of  the  connections  in  the 
network. Of particular interest is the possibility that by doing 
so they may increase the ability of the system to maintain high 
levels of cooperation (7,8). However, a general understanding 
of  how  agents  on  a  network  modify  their  interactions  with 
others  in  a  way  that  increases  total  cooperation  is  poorly 
understood.  In  each  domain  we  are,  at  the  broadest  level, 
interested  in  understanding/identifying  very  simple 
mechanisms that might cause self-interested agents to modify 
their  behaviour,  or  how  their  behaviours  are  affected  by 
others,  in  a  manner  that  increases  adaptation  or  efficiency 
either globally or at a higher-level of organisation than the 
individual.  
Taking an agent perspective, the obvious problem is this: If 
it is the case that agents collectively create adaptation that is 
not explained by the default selfish behaviours of individuals, 
then  it  must  be  the  case  that,  on  at  least  some  occasions, 
agents  take  decisions  that  are  detrimental  to  individual 
interests. If this were not the case then there is nothing to be 
explained over and above the selfish actions of individuals. 
But if it is the case, then this runs counter to any reasonable 
definition of a rational selfish agent. In what sense could it be 
self-consistent to suggest that a selfish agent has adopted a 
behaviour that decreased individual utility? One way to make 
sense of this is the possibility that, at the time that the agent Proc. of the Alife XII Conference, Odense, Denmark, 2010 660
takes this action, it appears to them be the best thing for them 
– that the agent is no longer making decisions according to the 
true utility function but some distortion of it that alters their 
perception  of  the  utility  of  that  action.  If  somehow  the 
perception of an agent were distorted in the right way, so that 
the action that it preferred, the one that it thought was best for 
it,  was  in  fact  the  action  that  was  globally  optimal,  then  a 
rational  agent  with  this  distorted  set  of  preferences  could 
increase global efficiency even at the cost of personal utility. 
One might assume that this is easier said than done – but in 
this paper we suggest that the reverse is true; it is easier to do 
than to explain how it works. However, the general problem 
and  the  essence  of  the  strategy  we  investigate  is 
straightforwardly  introduced  by  means  of  the  following 
simple parable. Although this makes the concepts intuitively 
accessible  it  might  tend  to  cast  the  model  in  a  narrow 
interpretation  –  it  is,  of  course,  not  really  a  model  about 
scientists  and  their  drinking  habits,  but  a  general  model  of 
interacting  agents  on  a  network  with  pair-wise  constraints 
between binary behaviours. 
Consider a community of individuals (e.g. researchers) in a 
social network. Each has an intrinsic symmetric compatibility, 
or  ‘complementarity’,  with  every  other  individual  that 
determines  the  productivity/pay-off  of  collaborating  with 
them.  Each  evening  all  researchers  attend  one  of  two 
intrinsically equal public houses (or other such collaborative 
projects) initially at random. Individuals must decide which to 
attend  based  solely  on  who  else  attends  that  venue.  Each 
individual seeks to maximise their scientific productivity by 
attending the pub that, on that night, maximises the sum of 
compatibilities  with  other  researchers  and  minimises 
incompatibilities.  Assessing  the  company  they  find  at  any 
moment, individuals therefore (one at a time in random order) 
may  choose  to  switch  pubs  to  maximise  their  productivity 
according to the locations of others. Since each individual has 
compatibilities  and  incompatibilities  with  all  other 
individuals,  each  must  choose  the  pub  that  offers  the  best 
compromise  of  these  conflicting  interests.  Since 
compatibilities  are  symmetric,  the  researchers  will  quickly 
reach a configuration where no-one wants to change pubs (9), 
however,  this  configuration  will  not  in  general  be  the 
arrangement that is maximal in total productivity, but merely 
a locally optimal configuration.  
This  describes  the  basic  behaviour  of  agents  on  the 
network. Our aim is to devise a simple individual strategy that 
causes  researchers  to  make  better  decisions  about  when  to 
change pubs such that total productivity is maximised. This 
will necessarily mean that some researchers, at some moments 
in  time,  must  change  pubs  even  though  it  decreases  their 
individual productivity. 
  Surprisingly, we find that this can be achieved (over many 
evenings)  by  implementing  a  very  simple  rule  –  each 
individual  must  develop  a  preference  for  drinking  with 
whichever other researchers they are drinking with right now. 
As Crosby, Stills and Nash put it “If you can’t be with the one 
you love, honey, love the one you’re with” (10). Since we 
already know the arrangements of researchers will be initially 
random and, most of the time, at best sub-optimal, this seems 
like a counter productive strategy. But, in fact we find that it 
is  capable,  given  enough  evenings  and  slowly  developed 
preferences, of causing all researchers to develop preferences 
that  cause  them  to  make  decisions  that  maximise  total 
productivity reliably every evening. 
  The agents that we model are therefore not wholly selfish 
agents – they sometimes take actions that do not maximise 
individual utility, which is the point of the exercise after all. 
But neither are they overtly cooperative or altruistic agents. 
They are simply habitual selfish agents. In this paper we are 
not directly addressing why it might be that selfish agents act 
as creatures of habit, although we will discuss this briefly. But 
we suggest this type of distorted perception of a true utility 
function,  one  which  agents  come  to  prefer  familiarity  over 
otherwise  obvious  opportunities  for  personal  gain,  is  one 
which  does  not  require  any  teleological  or,  certainly,  any 
centralised control and is therefore relevant to many domains. 
  In the next two sections we will detail an illustration of this 
strategy and the results we observe. In the Discussion section 
we will outline how this result can be interpreted in terms of 
adaptive network restructuring. Briefly: Initially, interactions 
between  agents  are  governed  by  a  network  of  intrinsic 
constraints (compatibilities), and latterly they are governed by 
a  combination  of  these  intrinsic  constraints  plus  the 
interaction preferences that the agents have developed. The 
new behavioural dynamics of the agents caused by interaction 
preferences can therefore equally be understood as a result of 
changes  to  connection  strengths  in  the  effective  interaction 
network.  The  increased  global  utility  observed  can  then  be 
explained using theory from computational neuroscience. In 
particular,  we  can  understand  how  the  system  as  a  whole 
improves global adaptation via the observation that when each 
agent  acts  as  a  creature  of  habit  it  changes  the  effective 
dependencies  in  the  network  in  a  Hebbian  manner  (11,12). 
This means that through the simple distributed actions of each 
individual agent, the network as a whole behaves in a manner 
that is functionally equivalent to a simple form of learning 
neural network (13). In this case, the network is not being 
trained by an external training set, but instead is ‘learning’ its 
own attractor states, as we will explain. We discuss how a 
separation of the timescales for behaviours on the network and 
behaviours of the network (i.e. changes to network structure) 
is essential for this result.  
Methods 
Default agents 
Our model involves N=100 agents playing two-player games 
on a fully connected network (Table 1). Specifically, for each 
game (i.e. each connection in the network), there is a single 
symmetric payoff matrix, Uij, which defines for agents i and j 
either  a  coordination  game  (α=1, β=0)  or  anti-coordination 
game (α=0, β=1) with equal probability (Table 1).  
Player 2   
A  B 
A  α,α  β,β  Player 
1  B  β,β  α,α 
Table 1: Payoff for (player 1, player 2). Proc. of the Alife XII Conference, Odense, Denmark, 2010 661
 
Games are played in extensive form, i.e., initially all agents in 
the  network  are  assigned  a  behaviour  at  random,  and  then 
each  agent  in  random  order  is  permitted  to  update  its 
behaviour (to either A or B). Each agent does so according to 
a best response strategy, i.e., to adopt the behaviour (choose a 
pub) that maximises its utility, ui (Eq.1) given the behaviours 





∑                    (1) 
where Uij(x,y) is the payoff received by player i when player i 
plays strategy x and player j plays strategy y (according to 
Table 1 above), and sn(t) is the strategy currently played by 
agent  n. Behaviours  are  updated  in  this  manner  repeatedly. 
Each agent is involved in many games but can adopt only one 
behaviour  at  any  one  time,  thus  coordinating  with  one 
neighbour  may  preclude  coordinating  with  another,  and  so 
each agent must therefore adopt the behaviour that is the best 
compromise of these constraints. By using a symmetric game, 
Uij=Uji, we can ensure that the system will reach a stable fixed 
point (9), i.e. a configuration where no agent wants to change 
behaviour unilaterally (14). Moreover, this configuration will 
be a local optimum in the total or global utility,  G, of the 
system  which  is  simply  the  sum  of  individual  utilities  (9) 
(Eq.2).  
                   (2) 
However, in general, the stable configuration reached from an 
arbitrary initial condition will not be globally maximal in total 
utility.  If  the  system  is  repeatedly  perturbed  (reassigning 
random behaviours to all agents) at infrequent intervals (here 
every 1000 time steps = one evening), and thereby allowed to 
settle, or relax, to many different local equilibria (on different 
evenings),  the  behaviour  of  the  system  given  these  default 
agents can be described by the distribution of total utilities 
found at the end of each of these ‘relaxations’ (Fig. 1.c).  
Creatures of habit 
We seek a simple distributed strategy that causes agents to 
make  different  (hence  unselfish)  behavioural  choices  in 
particular  contexts  in  such  a  manner  that  configurations  of 
higher  global  utility  are  attained  or  high  global  utility 
configurations are attained with greater reliability (i.e. from a 
greater number of random initial conditions). To this end we 
investigate agents that act as 'creatures of habit' by increasing 
their preference to coordinate with whichever neighbours they 
are  coordinated  with  at  the  present  moment  (regardless  of 
whether this is presently contributing positively or negatively 
to their utility). Specifically, in addition to the ‘true’ utility 
matrix, Uij, each agent also possesses a ‘preference’ matrix, 
Pij, for each of its connections. These are used to modify the 
behaviour of the agent such that it chooses the behaviour that 
maximises its ‘perceived utility’, pi, (Eq.3), instead of its true 
utility (Eq.2) alone: 
€ 
pi(t)= Uij(si(t),sj (t))+ Pij (t)(si(t),sj (t)) [ ]
j
N
∑        (3) 
where  Pij  is  a  pay-off  matrix  that  represents  an  agent’s 
preference for the combination of behaviours si and sj. The 
perceived utility is thus simply the sum of the true utility plus 
the agent’s preferences. Each agent has a separate preference 
pay-off  matrix  for  each  other  agent.  All  preference  payoff 
matrices are initially set to zero, such that the initial dynamics 
of the agents are as per the default agents. But as the values in 
these  matrices  change  over  time  they  may  come  to 
collectively overpower the tendency to maximise true utility 
and thereby cause agents to make different decisions about 
which behaviour is best for them to adopt.  
It  should  be  clear  that  it  is  possible  in  principle,  with 
knowledge of the globally optimal system configuration, to 
assign values to each of the Pij matrices that will cause agents 
to  adopt  behaviours  that  maximise  global  system  utility 
instead  of  choosing  behaviours  that  maximise  individual 
utility and thereby failing to maximise total utility. But our 
question then becomes how to enable agents to develop, via a 
simple distributed strategy (without knowledge of the global 
optimum,  of  course)  such  a  perception  of  interactions  with 
others  that  causes  them  to  make  these  globally  optimal 
decisions.  
The strategy we investigate is very simple – we assert that 
each  Pij  matrix  is  updated  so  as  to  increase  the  agent’s 
perceived  utility  at  the  current  moment.  Specifically, 
whenever  an  agent’s  behaviour  has  just  been  updated 
(whether it changed behaviour or not), with probability rp = 
0.0001 all of its Pij matrices will also be updated. To decide 
how  to  update  each  Pij  matrix,  one  of  two  possibilities  is 
considered (chosen at random), either 
 = Pij(t)+A or  = 
Pij(t)-A, where A is the adjustment matrix defined in Table 2. 
If  pi(t)_given_   >  pi(t)_given_
€ 





Player 2   
A  B 
A  r  -r  Player 
1  B  -r  r 
Table 2: adjustment matrix A (r=0.005) 
 
This  strategy  has  the  effect  of  increasing  agent  i’s 
preference for coordinating or anti-coordinating with agent j 
according  to  whether  it  is  currently  coordinating  or  anti-
coordinating  with  agent  j,  respectively.  Note  that  this 
preference is not sensitive to whether the interaction between 
these  two  agents  is  currently  contributing  positively  to  the 
utility  of  agent  i;  an  agent  increases  its  preference  for  the 
current  combination  of  behaviours  irrespective  of  whether 
.  It  is  thereby  simply  reinforcing  a 
preference for doing more of what it is currently doing with 
respect to coordinating with others (i.e. I’m in the same pub 
with them now, so change my preference so I like being in the 
same pub with them a little more or dislike it less). This is a 
counterintuitive strategy in the sense that it can increase the Proc. of the Alife XII Conference, Odense, Denmark, 2010 662
preference for coordinating with other agents even when Uij 
defines an anti-coordination game, and vice versa. Note that 
this habituation does not alter the independent preference for 
playing behaviour A or B, but instead alters the preference for 
coordinating behaviours with others. 
Results 
The system is run for 1000 relaxations, of 1000 time steps 
each,  without  habituation  (i.e.  default  agents).  Example 
trajectories of total utility for individual relaxations are shown 
in Fig1.a. The total utility at the end point of each relaxation is 
shown in Fig.1.b (first 1000 relaxations). The system is then 
run for 1000 relaxations with habituation (i.e. r=0.0005). As 
the  preference  utility  matrices  change  over  time  the 
distribution  of  local  optima  found  changes  (Fig.1.b, 
relaxations  1001-2000).  We  see  in  these  figures  that  the 
probability of finding the configurations with high total utility 
increases over time, such that the trajectories of the system 
after  habituation  (Fig.1.c)  find  high-utility  configurations 
reliably.  Histograms  of  the  total  utilities  found  before  and 
after habituation are shown in Fig.1.d. 
These  results  therefore  show  that  habituation  of  agent 
interactions, created by developing a preference for whatever 
combination  of  behaviours  is  currently  observed,  has  the 
effect of causing agents to adopt different behaviours in some 
situations  (essentially  because  the  resulting  combination  of 
behaviours  has  been  experienced  more  often  in  the  past). 
Specifically,  since  without  habituation  agents  adopt 
behaviours that maximise their individual (true) utility, so the 
different  behaviours  adopted  with  habituation  are  therefore 
behaviours that (at least temporarily) decrease their true utility 
–  otherwise  the  trajectories  would  not  be  different  (neutral 
changes  are  very  rare  in  this  system).  Over  time  agents 
therefore  come  to  choose  behaviours  that  decrease  their 
individual utility in certain circumstances, but that allow the 
system to ultimately reach states of global utility higher than 
would have been otherwise possible. Accordingly, trajectories 
before and after habitation are different, but more specifically, 
the  behavioural  choices  that  agents  make  after  habituation 
increase total system utility and are in this well-defined sense 
more cooperative.
a)     c)  
b)    d)  
 
Fig.1.  Behaviour  of  the  system  using  default  (no  habituation)  and  habituating  agents.  a)  Some  example  trajectories  of  system 
behaviour before habituation – each curve represents one relaxation (N=100, relaxation length 10N) – vertical axis is the total system utility 
(G, Eq 2); b) utilities of attractor states visited (i.e. end points of curves like those in (a)) without habituation (relaxations 1-1000) and 
during habituation (relaxations 1001-2000, r=0.0005); c) example trajectories after habituation; d) histogram of attractor utilities before 
habituation (relaxations 1-1000) and after habituation (relaxations 2001-3000), showing that after habituation the system reliably finds one 
of the highest total-utility configurations from any initial condition. 
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Results  collected  for  50  runs  (each  consisting  of  1000 
relaxations  before  habitation,  1000  relaxations  during 
habituation and 1000 relaxations after habituation) show that 
with  the  current  parameters,  the  global  utility  of  system 
configurations found after habituation is on average in the 93
rd 
percentile of global utilities of system configurations found 
before  habituation.  While  this  represents  a  considerable 
increase  in  the  likelihood  of  finding  a  high  utility  system 
configuration,  it  is  clear  that  with  the  current  learning  rate 
(r=0.0005)  habituation  will  not  always  cause  the  system  to 
ultimately  settle  at  the  global  optimum.  However,  it  is 
important to note that this is simply due to the learning rate 
used; with a sufficiently low learning rate, after habituation 
the  system  will  only  ever  find  the  global  optimum  utility 
configuration (13,15). 
  Discussion 
Adaptive networks  
 
An agent system where actions are governed by a perceived 
utility (rather than the true utility) is formally equivalent to a 
system  where  actions  are  governed  by  a  new  network  of 
constraints  (rather  than  the  original  network  of  constraints) 
(28).  Here  we  have  been  modelling  a  system  that  is  fully 
connected  with  coordination  and  anti-coordination  games 
played on the edges of that network. This is equivalent to a 
weighted network, where edges are weighted by ωij=±1, and 
all  games  are  coordination  games  (α=1, β=0)  with  pay-off 
ωijUij. (i.e. each of the table entries in Uij is multiplied by the 
scalar ωij). The structure of the games defined by the pay-off 
matrices is thus converted into the connections of the network 
(with  identical  pay-off  matrices).  Further,  the  addition  of  a 
preference matrix (restricted to the limited form investigated 
here)  is  equivalent  to  an  alteration  of  this  weighting; 
specifically,  (ωij+kijr)Uij,  where  r  is  the  learning  rate  (as 
above) and kij is the number of times agents i and j have been 
coordinated in the past minus the number of times they have 
been  anti-coordinated  (note  that  kij  will  always  equal  kji, 
ensuring that the connections remain symmetric if they start 
symmetric).  Thus,  although  conceptually  contrasting, 
changing  the  perception  of  pay-offs  for  agent  i  via  a 
preference  matrix  is  functionally  identical  to  altering  the 
connection  strengths  between  the  agents.  We  chose  not  to 
introduce  the  model  in  these  terms,  in  part  because  it  is 
important to realise that although an agents’ behaviours will 
be  governed  by  the  new  connections,  the  effects  on  global 
‘true’ utility that we are interested in must be measured using 
the original connection strengths (13) (it should be clear that if 
this were not the case it would be trivial for agents to alter 
connections  in  a  manner  that  would  make  satisfying 
constraints easier for them and thereby increase total utility). 
Nonetheless, this perspective helps us to connect the current 
work with studies of adaptive networks (6) where agents on a 
network can alter the topology (here, connection strengths) of 
connections in the network. We can thereby understand the 
system we have illustrated to be an example of how agents on 
a  network  can  ‘re-structure’  the  network  in  a  manner  that 
enhances the resolution of conflicting constraints and thereby 
global efficiency. Other works in this area include that of (7,8) 
where agents on a network, playing a variety of games, re-
wire their links when their utility is low, but keep the local 
topology unchanged if their utility is high. Although there are 
several important technical differences with the current work, 
the basic intuition that agents should alter network topology to 
make  themselves  happier  (or  at  least,  alter  it  if  they  are 
unhappy) is common to both. 
  In  essence,  the  form  of  habituation  we  model  is  a  very 
simple  form  of  re-structuring;  it  simply  asserts  that 
connections between agents increase or decrease in strength in 
a  manner  that  reinforces  the  current  combinations  of 
behaviours observed. The effects of this habituation are put 
into  context  by  considering  the  problem  at  hand:  we  are 
dealing with a limited form of global optimisation problem 
(16)  in  which  local  optima  (and  the  global  optimum)  are 
created by the inability to resolve many overlapping low-order 
dependencies (17, 13). When using simple local search on this 
problem (i.e. agents without habituation), there is only a small 
probability of finding configurations with high global utility 
(Fig.1.a  and  b);  however,  they  are  found  nonetheless. 
Habituation  outcompetes  local  search,  not  by  finding  new 
configurations  of  absolute  higher  utility  (although  this  may 
occur in some cases), but instead by progressively increasing 
the  probability  of  finding  high  utility  configurations,  until 
only one configuration is ever found (which is very likely to 
be one of high utility). We can therefore view habituation as a 
mechanism that gradually transforms the search space of the 
problem from one with many varied local optima, to one with 
a  single  (and  very  likely  high  utility)  optimum,  which  will 
always  be  reached;  furthermore,  it  does  so  via  a  simple 
distributed strategy. 
Specifically, although it is not immediately obvious from a 
static  analysis  of  the  connection  matrix  which  connections 
should be increased and which decreased in order to cause 
selfish  agents  to  solve  the  problem  better,  the  necessary 
information is naturally revealed by allowing the system to 
repeatedly  settle  to  local  optima  and  reinforcing  the 
correlations in behaviours so created. These correlations are 
created  by  the  connections  of  the  original  network  in  an 
indirect  manner.  For  example,  a  particular  constraint  may 
often  remain  unsatisfied  in  locally  optimal  configurations 
even  though  the  direct  connection  defining  this  constraint 
states  that  it  is  just  as  valuable  to  satisfy  it  as  any  other 
connection.  Then  if  a  constraint  is  often  easily  satisfied  its 
importance is strengthened, if it is equally often satisfied and 
unsatisfied it remains unchanged on average, and when agents 
are on average unable to satisfy it its importance is weakened 
and eventually its sign can be reversed. This causes the system 
to, gradually over time, pay more attention to the connections 
that can be simultaneously satisfied and weaken or soften the 
constraints that cannot be satisfied. One way to understand the 
result  of  this  adaptive  constraint  relaxation/exaggeration  is 
that agents become specialists, i.e. selectively attuned to some 
constraints  more  than  others.  That  is,  whereas  the  default 
agents  are  generalists  who  persist  in  trying  to  satisfy  all 
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agents, through the self-organisation of the behaviours on the 
network, come to specialise in a manner that ‘for their own 
comfort’  (i.e.  for  the  immediate  increase  of  their  perceived 
utility)  fits  together  better  with  one  another  but  thereby 
actually resolves more of the system constraints in total.  
Self-structuring adaptive networks, neural network 
learning and associative memory 
How this type of adaptive network, with very simple, local 
modification of connections, comes to maximise global utility 
can be explained formally using theory from computational 
neuroscience.  Specifically,  the  behaviour  of  the  network  of 
default agents detailed above is identical to the behaviour of 
the discrete Hopfield network (9) (which is just a bit-flip hill-
climber (15)) and when connections between nodes increase 
or decrease in strength in a manner that reinforces the current 
combinations  of  behaviours  this  is  formally  equivalent  to 
Hebbian learning (13). Hebb’s rule, in the context of neural 
network learning, is often represented by the slogan neurons 
that  fire  together  wire  together,  meaning  that  synaptic 
connections between neurons that have correlated activation 
are  strengthened.  This  learning  rule  has  the  effect  of 
transforming correlated neural activations into causally linked 
neural  activations,  which  from  a  dynamical  systems 
perspective, has the effect of enlarging the basin of attraction 
for the current activation pattern/system configuration. This 
type  of  learning  can  be  used  to  train  a  recurrent  neural 
network  to  store  a  given  set  of  training  patterns  (9)  thus 
forming what is known as an ‘associative memory’ of these 
patterns. A network trained with an associative memory then 
has  the  ability  to  ‘recall’  the  training  pattern  that  is  most 
similar to a partially specified or corrupted test pattern. 
  Formally, a common simplified form of Hebb’s rule states 
that the change in a synaptic connection strength ωij is Δωij = 
δsisj where δ>0 is a fixed parameter controlling the learning 
rate and sn is the current activation of the n
th neuron. Here by 
changing  the  pay-off  matrix  of  each  individual  by  kij(t)rUij 
where kij(t) is the correlation of behaviours at time t, we are 
effecting  exactly  the  same  changes.  Thus  the  habituating 
agents each modify their perceived utilities in a manner that 
effects Hebbian changes to connection strengths – which they 
must  if  these  preferences  are  to  mean  that  this  behaviour 
combination is preferred more. This equivalence at the agent 
level has the consequence that the system of agents as a whole 
implements  an  associative  memory.  Since  this  is  a  self-
organised network, not a network trained by some external 
experimenter,  this  is  not  an  associative  memory  of  any 
externally  imposed  training  patterns.  Rather  this  is  an 
associative  memory  of  the  configuration  patterns  that  are 
commonly experienced under the networks intrinsic dynamics 
– and given the perturbation and relaxation protocol we have 
adopted, which means that the system spends most of its time 
at locally optimal configurations, it is these configurations that 
the associative memory stores. 
From a neural network learning point of view, a network 
that forms a memory of its own attractors is a peculiar idea 
(indeed,  the  converse  is  more  familiar  (18)).  Forming  an 
associative memory means that a system forms attractors that 
represent  particular  patterns  or  state  configurations.  For  a 
network to form an associative memory of its own attractors 
therefore seems redundant; it will be forming attractors that 
represent attractors that it already has. However, in forming an 
associative  memory  of  its  own  attractors  the  system  will 
nonetheless alter its attractors; it does not alter their positions 
in state configuration space, but it does alter the size of their 
basins of attraction (i.e. the set of initial conditions that lead to 
a given attractor state via local energy minimisation).  
Specifically, the more often a particular state configuration 
is visited the more its basin of attraction will be enlarged and 
the more it will be visited in future, and so on. Because every 
initial condition is in exactly one basin of attraction it must be 
the case that some attractor basins are enlarged at the expense 
of  others.  Accordingly,  attractors  that  have  initially  small 
basins  of  attraction  will  be  visited  infrequently,  and  as  the 
basins of other, more commonly visited attractors increase in 
size,  so  these  infrequently  visited  attractors  will  decrease. 
Eventually,  with  continued  positive  feedback,  one  attractor 
will out-compete all others, resulting in there being only one 
attractor remaining in the system.  
  But what has this got to do with resolving the constraints 
that were defined in the original connections of the system? 
One might expect, given naïve positive feedback principles, 
that  the  one  remaining  attractor  would  have  the  mean  or 
perhaps  modal  global  utility  of  the  attractor  states  in  the 
original system; but this is not the case (Fig.1.d). In order to 
understand  whether  the  competition  between  attractors  in  a 
self-modelling system enlarges attractors with especially high 
total  utility  or  not,  we  need  to  understand  the  relationship 
between  attractor  basin  size  and  the  total  utility  of  their 
attractor states. At first glance it might appear that there is no 
special reason why the largest attractor should be the ‘best’ 
(highest utility) attractor – after all, it is not generally true in 
optimisation problems that the basin of attraction for a locally 
optimal  solution  is  proportional  to  its  quality.  But  in  fact, 
existing theory tells us that this is indeed the case (17) for 
systems  that  are  additively  composed  of  many  low-order 
interactions. Specifically, in systems that are built from the 
superposition of many symmetric pair-wise interactions, the 
height (with respect to total utility) of an attractor basin is 
positively  related  to  its  width  (the  size  of  the  basin  of 
attraction),  and  the  globally  optimal  attractor  state  has  the 
largest basin of attraction. One must not conflate, however, 
the idea that the global optimum has the largest basin, with the 
idea that it is a significant proportion of the total configuration 
space  and  therefore  easy  to  find:  In  particular,  the  global 
optimum  may  be  unique,  whereas  there  will  generally  be 
many  more  attractors  that  lead  to  inferior  solutions,  and 
importantly,  the  basins  of  these  sub-optimal  attractors  will 
collectively  occupy  much  more  of  the  configuration  space 
than the basin of the global optimum.    
Given  that  high  utility  attractors  have  larger  basins  than 
low  utility  attractors,  they  are  therefore  visited  more 
frequently and therefore out-compete low utility attractors in 
this self-modelling system. Thus, (in the limit of low learning 
rates  such  that  the  system  can  visit  a  sufficient  sample  of 
attractors) we expect that when a dynamical system forms an 
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behaviour it will produce a ‘model’ with ultimately only one 
attractor,  and  this  attractor  will  correspond  to  the  globally 
optimal minimisation of constraints between variables in the 
original system (13).  
  This is not an entirely satisfactory conclusion however. It 
implies  that  the  system  only  fixes  on  the  global  optimum 
because the global optimum has already been visited many 
times in the past. But this is not the full story. A final part of 
the puzzle is provided by the well-known ability of Hebbian 
learning  to  generalise  training  patterns  and  create  learned 
attractors  that  represent  new  combinations  of  common 
features  from  the  training  patterns  rather  than  the  training 
patterns per se. In associative memory research the creation of 
such  ‘spurious  attractors’  is  generally  considered  to  be  a 
nuisance (18,19), but it in fact represents a simple form of 
generalisation that is important for our results. Producing new 
attractor  states  that  are  new  combinations  of  features  (sub-
patterns)  observed  in  the  training  patterns  (20)  enables  the 
globally optimal attractor to be enlarged even though it has 
not  yet  been  visited.  Basically,  this  occurs  because  when 
Hebbian learning is applied to a training pattern it not only has 
the effect of enlarging the basin of attraction for this pattern, 
but  also  it  enlarges  the  basin  of  attraction  for  all 
configurations  in  proportion  to  how  many  behaviour-pairs 
they share in common. The global optimum is, by definition, 
the configuration that has the most simultaneously satisfied 
constraints, and this ensures that, on average at least, it tends 
to  share  many  behaviour  combinations  in  common  with 
locally  optimal  configurations  that  have  many  constraints 
simultaneously  satisfied  (but  not  as  many  as  globally 
possible). 
Lastly on this equivalence, it is essential to recognise how 
the separation of the timescales for behaviours on the network 
and  behaviours  of  the  network  (i.e.  changes  to  network 
structure) influence this result. Getting the timescale of the 
changes  to  network  structure  correct  is  equivalent  to  the 
problem  of  setting  the  learning  rate  correctly  in  a  neural 
network. If connections are modified too slowly then learning 
is unnecessarily slow. And if learning happens too quickly the 
network will only learn the first local optimum it arrives at, or 
worse, if the learning rate is really high, the system could get 
stuck on some transient configuration that is not even locally 
optimal. More generally, if most learning happens at or near 
random  initial  conditions  then  the  patterns  learnt  will  be 
similarly random. It is therefore essential that the system is 
allowed  to  relax  to  local  optima,  and  that  most  learning 
therefore happens at local optima, so that the patterns learned 
are  better  than  random.  But  if  the  system  is  not  perturbed 
frequently  enough  or  vigorously  enough,  and  consequently 
spends all of its time at one or a few local optima, the system 
will simply learn these attractor configurations and will not 
generalise correctly. 
Limitations and further work 
Why  would  agents  be  creatures  of  habit?  In  this  paper  we 
have  mandated  that  (otherwise  selfish)  agents  behave  as 
creatures  of  habit  and  examined  the  consequences  of  this 
simple local mechanism on global system behaviour. But we 
are also interested in the question of whether selfish agents, 
given the opportunity to alter their preferences according to 
their own self-interest, would alter them in a Hebbian/habit 
forming manner. Intuitively, we suggest that this is indeed the 
case – that forming preferences for the status quo is a natural 
strategy  for  any  agent  that  favours  exploitation  over 
exploration, as any non-teleological agent must.  
There is some interesting subtlety involved here however. 
If an agent’s perceptions only alter the perceived utility of its 
actions, and not its true utility, then an agent can only assess a 
proposed  change  in  perception  as  having  some  real 
consequence for its utility if that change in perception causes 
it to change its behaviours and hence its true utility. Note that 
when  the  system  is  at  a  locally  optimal  configuration  all 
changes  to  behaviours  are  deleterious,  whereas  Hebbian 
changes to preferences never cause a change in behaviour and 
are therefore neutral. This indicates a preference for Hebbian 
changes  in  a  somewhat  subtle  sense.  However,  when 
behaviours are discrete (and deterministic) as in the current 
model, most changes to preferences, either Hebbian or non-
Hebbian,  will  not  cause  a  change  in  behaviour  and  will 
therefore be neutral.  
Investigations  using  alternate  behavioural  models  are 
therefore being developed elsewhere to address this question. 
This relates to work we are developing in the context of co-
evolving species in an ecosystem where species may evolve 
the coefficients of a Lotka-Volterra system (21,22) or evolve 
symbiotic relationships (23). This connects the current work 
with  concepts  we  refer  to  as  ‘social  niche  construction’ 
(24,25,26,27). 
Altruism  in  populations  of  self-interested  individuals  has 
been well researched (e.g. 29); however, very few previous 
studies investigate games on adaptive networks. Those that do 
(7,8) differ in a number of ways from the current model, in 
that  here,  we:  a)  only  address  one  type  of  game 
(coordination/anti-coordination  games),  b)  play  games  in 
normal form, and c) only allow strategies to be adopted to a 
best-response strategy, rather than by replication equations. 
   However, despite the novelty of the current model, there 
appears to be an important similarity between this and many 
other  game  theoretic  models  (network  or  otherwise)  which 
observe flourishing altruism. Whether they do so by giving 
agents memory of their past games (30), allowing ‘reputation’ 
(31), rewiring links (7,8) or changing link weightings (15), all 
of  these  models  promote  altruism  by  giving  the  system  a 
method of passing information from one game to the next, that 
is  not  available  in  the  simple,  non-altruistic  case.  This 
information  passing  effectively  forms  a  distributed  system-
level memory, allowing optimisation over multiple games – a 
mechanism  that  unites  these  disparate  mechanisms  under  a 
common theme.  
Finally, it should be noted that the Hopfield model is not 
new  (9),  and  its  capabilities  for  Hebbian  learning  are  well 
known (18). However, here we provide a reinterpretation of 
the  system,  staging  it  in  a  generic,  game-theoretic  network 
scenario. This opens up the possibility of reinterpretation of 
some of the analytically solved variants of the Hopfield model 
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Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the effect of a simple distributed 
strategy for increasing total utility in systems of selfish agents. 
Specifically, habituating selfish agents develop a preference 
for coordinating behaviours with those they are coordinating 
with at the present moment, and henceforth adopt behaviours 
that maximise the sum of true utility and these preferences. 
We  show  that  this  causes  agents  to  modify  the  dynamical 
attractors of the system as a whole in a manner that enlarges 
the basins of attraction for system configurations with high 
total  utility.  This  means  that  after  habituation,  agents 
sometimes make decisions about their behaviour that may (at 
least temporarily) decrease their personal utility but that in the 
long  run  increases  (the  probability  of  arriving  at 
configurations that maximise) global utility. We show that the 
habituating  agents  effectively  restructure  the  connections  in 
the network in a Hebbian manner and thus through the simple 
distributed actions of each individual agent, the network as a 
whole behaves in a manner that is functionally equivalent to a 
simple  form  of  learning  neural  network.  This  network 
improves global adaptation by forming an associative memory 
of  locally  optimal  configurations  that,  via  the  inherent 
generalisation properties of associative memory, enlarges the 
basin of attraction of the global optima. This work thereby 
helps us to understand self-organisation in networks of selfish 
agents and very simple processes that subtly deviate selfish 
agents in the direction that maximises global utility without 
overtly  prescribing  cooperation  or  using  any  form  of 
centralised control. 
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